{"id":5975,"date":"2026-09-23T07:35:25","date_gmt":"2026-09-23T07:35:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/?p=5975"},"modified":"2026-09-23T07:35:26","modified_gmt":"2026-09-23T07:35:26","slug":"shaping-the-intelligent-age-klaus-schwab-on-techno-capitalism-ai-concentration-and-collective-intelligence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/2026\/09\/shaping-the-intelligent-age-klaus-schwab-on-techno-capitalism-ai-concentration-and-collective-intelligence\/","title":{"rendered":"Shaping the Intelligent Age: Klaus Schwab on Techno-Capitalism, AI Concentration, and Collective Intelligence<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\n

“The unit of responsibility must be at least as large as the unit of power.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

\u2014 Klaus Schwab, Founder of the World Economic Forum<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q1. In 1971, you published Modern Enterprise Management in Mechanical Engineering and argued that a company must serve not only shareholders but all stakeholders to achieve long-term growth and prosperity. That same year you founded the World Economic Forum to promote the stakeholder concept. Fifty-five years later, Thriving and Leading in the Intelligent Age extends that foundational argument into a world shaped by artificial intelligence. How has the arrival of the Intelligent Age changed \u2014 or deepened \u2014 your original conviction about stakeholder capitalism, and where do you see the greatest tension between the stakeholder model and the economic logic of how AI is currently being developed and deployed?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klaus Schwab<\/strong>: <\/strong>The Intelligent Age has not changed my conviction; it has tested it more severely than anything since 1971. When I wrote about the enterprise’s obligations to clients, employees, investors, and society, I was arguing against a narrow model of ownership. Today the argument is no longer only about who owns the enterprise. It is about who controls the systems on which everybody else depends: the computing infrastructure, the data, the models, the platforms through which people find work, credit, information, and opportunity. I have come to call this configuration of power “techno-capitalism,” and it is organized differently from the industrial or financial capitalism that stakeholder theory was originally built to civilize.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The greatest tension is this: the economic logic of frontier AI rewards scale, speed, and concentration. A handful of companies now produce the overwhelming majority of the world’s most capable models, and the infrastructure beneath them (chips, data centers, energy) is similarly concentrated. That logic is not evil; scale can fund the safety research and the security that a fragmented industry could not afford. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But it is in tension with a stakeholder model that assumes negotiation among relatively balanced parties. A worker instructed by an algorithm, a small business dependent on a platform’s ranking rules, a creator whose work trains a model without consent. These stakeholders often have no realistic exit and no seat at the table. Stakeholder capitalism must therefore evolve from an appeal to enterprise conscience into an institutional architecture of rights, graduated duties, and remedy that is sized to match the scale of the power it is meant to govern. The unit of responsibility must be at least as large as the unit of power. That is the deepening the Intelligent Age has demanded of the idea I first set out fifty-five years ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q2. You describe the Intelligent Age as one where intelligence \u2014 human, artificial, and collective \u2014 has become the world’s most powerful resource. That framing places collective intelligence alongside human and artificial intelligence as a distinct and co-equal category. What do you mean by collective intelligence in this context, and why do you believe it is as important as the other two \u2014 particularly at a moment when AI seems to be accelerating individual and organizational capability in ways that may actually be reducing the capacity for genuine collective reasoning and shared deliberation?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klaus Schwab<\/strong>: <\/strong>By collective intelligence I do not mean the sum of many individual intelligences, human or artificial. I mean the capacity of a group, a company, a profession, a nation, an international community to reason and decide together in ways no single mind, however augmented, could achieve alone. It is what allowed the World Economic Forum, across five decades of crises, to convene competitors, regulators, unions, and civil society around problems that none of them could solve unilaterally. It is a genuine third form of intelligence, with its own conditions for success: trust, shared facts, structured deliberation, and institutions capable of holding disagreement without fracturing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The danger is that we replace multiple personal interactions through AI. In other words, AI absorbs collective intelligence. This might make collective decision processes faster and more efficient but deprive them of qualitative reflections and subject them much more to failures in the algorithms. This is why I place collective intelligence beside the other two rather than beneath them: an economy of extraordinary individual and machine capability, without the institutions and habits of shared reasoning, produces fragmentation dressed up as progress. Cultivating collective intelligence in the Intelligent Age is not a nostalgic exercise. It is the only mechanism I know of that can direct enormous individual and artificial capability toward outcomes a society actually chooses, rather than outcomes that simply emerge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q3. You call for leaders to build what you describe as “strategic intelligence” \u2014 the ability to anticipate change before it disrupts. But the history of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which you named and described in your 2016 book, suggests that even the most thoughtful observers consistently underestimate both the speed and the direction of technological disruption. What does strategic intelligence actually look like in practice for a leader who is genuinely trying to anticipate the next inflection point in AI \u2014 and where do you believe the conventional wisdom among business and political leaders today is most dangerously wrong about what is coming?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klaus Schwab<\/strong>: <\/strong>You are right to press on this, and I will not pretend the record of forecasting, mine included, has been perfect. When I described the Fourth Industrial Revolution in 2016, I underestimated how quickly generative systems would move from research curiosity to general-purpose infrastructure, and I was not alone. Strategic intelligence, in practice, is less about predicting the specific technology and more about building an organization’s capacity to notice weak signals early, to hold several futures as plausible at once rather than committing to one, and to act on incomplete information without waiting for certainty that will never come. It looks like scenario discipline, dedicated resources for horizon-scanning that report directly to leadership rather than being buried in an innovation unit, and the humility to revise strategy in public when the evidence changes, rather than defending a forecast that has already been overtaken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where I believe conventional wisdom is most dangerously wrong today is in treating the coming disruption primarily as a question of which tasks AI will automate. That framing has leaders competing over efficiency gains while missing the structural questions: who controls the infrastructure and models on which entire economies increasingly depend, and what happens to accountability when responsibility for a harmful outcome is distributed across a model developer, a deployer, a data provider, and a platform, each of whom can plausibly claim compliance while no one accepts responsibility for the whole. Leaders who anticipate only the labor-market disruption will be well prepared for the wrong crisis. The leaders with genuine strategic intelligence right now are the ones asking who governs the systems, not only how fast the systems will change what their people do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q4. Your book calls for leaders to align innovation with ethics, empathy, and long-term value creation \u2014 but in practice, the competitive dynamics of AI development create enormous pressure to move faster than ethics can follow, and to capture value before governance frameworks can catch up. You have spent fifty years convening the world’s most powerful leaders at Davos, watching how those competitive pressures play out across industries and nations. What have you learned about what actually causes leaders to slow down and make the harder, values-based choices \u2014 and is there any realistic mechanism, whether regulatory, competitive, or cultural, that can reliably produce that outcome at the scale and speed the Intelligent Age demands?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klaus Schwab<\/strong>: <\/strong>Fifty years of convening leaders through oil shocks, financial crises, and technological upheavals has taught me to be skeptical of appeals to conscience alone. I have watched extraordinarily thoughtful executives make decisions under competitive pressure that they would not defend at a dinner table. Exhortation rarely changes behavior at the pace or scale we need; incentives and accountability structures do. What actually causes leaders to slow down is some combination of three things: peers and investors who treat responsible practice as a condition of doing business rather than a virtue signal, regulation that is credible enough to be a genuine cost of non-compliance, and competitors who have made the harder choice public and durable enough that others cannot easily undercut them on it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So no, I do not believe there is a purely cultural mechanism that will reliably work at the speed the Intelligent Age demands. What I believe can work is a graduated architecture: enforceable stakeholder rights for those most exposed to an AI system’s decisions, differentiated obligations that fall more heavily on the gatekeepers and providers of systemic infrastructure than on smaller challengers who cannot absorb the same compliance burden, and international interoperability around a limited set of principles: human oversight, transparency, effective remedy, so that responsible companies are not simply undercut by jurisdictions with none. This is beginning to take shape in instruments like the OECD’s due diligence guidance and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on AI. None of it is sufficient alone. Together, incentive, accountability, and interoperable standards can do what appeals to values consistently fail to do on their own \u2014 make the harder choice also the rational one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q5. You argue that in the Intelligent Age, human and artificial intelligence must work in synergy rather than in competition. That is a compelling vision. But it assumes a kind of partnership that current AI deployment trends do not obviously support \u2014 where the dominant commercial logic is to replace human judgment with AI judgment wherever the economics favor it. What does the synergy you describe actually require from organizations, from education systems, and from public policy that is not yet in place \u2014 and what is the most important thing that leaders can do right now to preserve the conditions for genuine human-AI collaboration rather than simply accepting substitution?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klaus Schwab<\/strong>: <\/strong>You are describing accurately the default trajectory, and I do not want to understate it: left to pure cost logic, substitution will win more often than augmentation, because substitution is easier to measure and faster to realize on a balance sheet. Genuine synergy requires deliberate counterweights at three levels. Organizations need what I call an augmentation covenant, a negotiated, measurable compact attached to every major AI transformation that identifies which tasks will change, involves employees or their legitimate representatives in redesigning the work rather than simply announcing it, provides paid time to learn, and reports honestly on whether productivity gains are strengthening job quality alongside financial performance. Education systems need to treat continuous professional renewal as part of employment itself, with portable, recognized credentials, rather than assuming a young person’s initial training will carry them through a working life. And public policy needs mechanisms, collective bargaining in some countries, portable benefits and learning accounts in others, that ensure the intelligence dividend is broadly shared rather than accruing only to the owners of the machines. None of this exists at the scale required today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The single most important thing a leader can do right now is sequence the covenant before the deployment, not after. Too often the transition compact for workers arrives once displacement has already occurred, as a remedy rather than a design principle. A leader who negotiates the augmentation covenant at the same moment the AI system is adopted – not after the layoffs – is making a structural choice for partnership rather than an after-the-fact gesture of goodwill. That sequencing, more than any statement of values, is what determines whether an organization ends up with genuine human-AI synergy or simply substitution with better public relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q6. Thriving and Leading in the Intelligent Age is described as the first volume in the Intelligent Age Series \u2014 which suggests you see this as a sustained intellectual project rather than a single statement. What are the most important questions that this first volume cannot fully answer \u2014 the ones you believe will define the subsequent volumes \u2014 and how do you think about the risk that the technology will evolve faster than any series of books can track, making each volume obsolete before the next one is written?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klaus Schwab<\/strong>: <\/strong>I conceived this as a series rather than a single book precisely because no single volume, however carefully argued, could do justice to a transformation of this scope. Thriving and Leading in the Intelligent Age sets out the orientation a leader needs: strategic intelligence, collective intelligence, the synergy between human and machine judgment. It deliberately leaves open the harder institutional questions that the later volumes take up directly: how a competitive enterprise structures itself and its governance when intelligence itself is the contested resource; how societies restore truth and trust when the information environment is increasingly mediated by systems whose incentives are not aligned with either; what longevity and an extended working life mean for retirement, care, and the social contract once both human lifespans and machine capability are changing simultaneously; and what universities, professors, and students owe one another when the premise of higher education, that expertise takes years to acquire and then holds its value, is itself under pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the risk of obsolescence, I hold two convictions that may seem in tension but are not. The specific technological detail in any book about AI will indeed be outdated within a year or two; I accept that, and I would rather publish something useful now than wait for a certainty that will never arrive. But the questions I am asking who controls the infrastructure, how responsibility is allocated when it is distributed across many actors, how gains are shared, what collective reasoning requires, are not questions about a particular model generation. They are questions about power, purpose, and accountability that recur across every technological transition I have lived through. A book anchored in those questions ages far better than one anchored in a particular capability benchmark. That is deliberately how this series is built.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q7. You have engaged with every major global crisis of the past fifty years \u2014 oil shocks, financial crashes, pandemics, wars, and now the rise of AI \u2014 from your unique position at the center of global economic and political dialogue. Looking across all of those crises, what do you believe the Intelligent Age has in common with previous transformative moments \u2014 and what is genuinely unprecedented about it in ways that make the leadership frameworks developed for previous disruptions inadequate or misleading?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klaus Schwab<\/strong>: <\/strong>Every crisis I have observed closely – the oil shocks of the 1970s, the financial crisis of 2008, the pandemic – shared a common structure. A shock exposed a gap between the speed of events and the speed of the institutions meant to manage them, and the resolution, when it came, required actors who normally compete or distrust one another to cooperate around shared facts and a shared sense of urgency. That is also true of the Intelligent Age, and it is why I still believe convening remains valuable: no single company, government, or discipline can govern this transition alone, any more than any one of them could have managed 2008 alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What is genuinely unprecedented, and where I think frameworks built for earlier disruptions can mislead us, is twofold. First, previous industrial transitions multiplied human physical power; this one multiplies, and in places substitutes for, human perception, analysis, prediction, and judgment itself, the very faculties earlier crisis-response frameworks assumed leaders and institutions would use to manage the crisis. Second, and this is the point I find most consequential, the governing power in this transition is disproportionately private and global from the outset, whereas oil shocks and financial crises, however global their effects, were ultimately resolved through instruments, central banks, national regulators, treaties among states that possessed clear public authority. Today, systems with quasi-public consequences are governed principally through corporate structures accountable to shareholders and, unevenly, to national law. Leadership frameworks built around the assumption that a sufficiently empowered state or central bank can eventually act decisively do not map cleanly onto a crisis whose infrastructure a state may not even be able to fully inspect. That is the genuinely new leadership problem of the Intelligent Age.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q8. Your book is addressed to executives, entrepreneurs, professionals, and curious learners \u2014 a deliberately broad audience. But the leaders who most need to master change with purpose in the Intelligent Age may be those in the public sector \u2014 governments, regulators, international institutions \u2014 whose capacity for adaptive leadership has historically lagged far behind that of the private sector. What is your most honest assessment of whether public institutions are capable of leading in the Intelligent Age rather than simply reacting to it \u2014 and what would need to change, structurally and culturally, for that to become possible?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klaus Schwab<\/strong>: <\/strong>My most honest assessment is that most public institutions today are not positioned to lead in the Intelligent Age, and that the gap is not primarily one of intention. I have sat across the table from ministers and regulators who understand the stakes as clearly as any technology executive. The gap is capacity: governments are frequently in the position of procuring, regulating, or depending on systems they lack the internal technical competence to fully inspect, replace, or govern on their own terms. A regulator who cannot evaluate a model except through what its developer chooses to disclose is not a regulator in any meaningful sense; it is a dependent customer with enforcement powers it cannot confidently use.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What would need to change is structural before it is cultural. Public institutions need enough internal technical competence \u2014 hired, retained, and paid competitively \u2014 to be what I call an intelligent buyer, regulator, and guardian of the public interest, rather than outsourcing that judgment to the parties they oversee. They need procurement and partnership frameworks with published mandates, disclosed decision rights, independent evaluation, and built-in provisions for review and knowledge transfer, so that public-private cooperation strengthens public authority instead of substituting for it. And internationally, they need to align on a limited set of interoperable principles, human oversight, transparency, effective remedy, because no single national regulator, however capable, can govern systems that operate globally by acting alone. The cultural shift, which does matter, is a willingness among political leaders to treat technical competence in the civil service as a strategic asset worth investing in during a period of comfortable growth, rather than a cost to be cut, because that competence is precisely what determines whether government reacts to the Intelligent Age or helps direct it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q9. The World Economic Forum has been both celebrated and criticized across its fifty-year history \u2014 celebrated as a convening force for global cooperation on shared challenges, criticized as a forum that brings together extraordinary power without adequate accountability, and more recently as a symbol of a globalist consensus that large parts of the world’s populations have actively rejected. As you look at the Intelligent Age and the leadership challenges you describe in this book, how do you think about the role that institutions like the World Economic Forum should play \u2014 and what has the rise of populism and democratic disillusionment taught you about the limits of elite-driven approaches to governing transformative technologies?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klaus Schwab<\/strong>: <\/strong>I take the criticism seriously, and I would not be honest with you if I dismissed it as mere misunderstanding. Any institution that convenes concentrated power, even for constructive purposes, has to answer the question of who it is accountable to, and for many years that answer was not as clear or as public as it should have been. The rise of populism and democratic disillusionment has taught me something I should perhaps have internalized earlier: that convening is not the same as legitimacy, and that legitimacy cannot be borrowed from the credentials or good intentions of the people in the room. It has to be built through transparency about mandates and financing, structured representation for the workers, citizens, and communities affected by the decisions under discussion, and independent evaluation of outcomes, the same institutional safeguards I now argue must govern any public-private cooperation, applied to convening itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for the role institutions like the Forum should play in the Intelligent Age, I believe it is narrower and more disciplined than it may once have appeared: a place where governments, companies, and civil society can build the shared facts and working relationships that crisis cooperation requires, but never a substitute for the democratic institutions, legislatures, courts, elected governments that alone hold final authority over public purpose. Populism’s core objection, at its most legitimate, is to elites making decisions with public consequences and no public accountability. The answer to that objection is not to convene less. It is to ensure that convening is explicitly subordinate to democratic authority rather than a parallel channel around it. That is a harder discipline than the Forum has always practiced, and it is one I think this era requires of every institution like it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q10. You were born in Ravensburg, Germany in 1938 \u2014 which means your first years were lived through the most catastrophic failure of human governance in modern history, followed by a lifetime spent building institutions designed to ensure that such failures could never happen again. You founded the World Economic Forum at thirty-three, wrote your first book on stakeholder capitalism the same year, and are now, at eighty-eight, writing a new series of books about how humanity should lead through the most powerful technological transformation it has ever faced. That is an extraordinary arc \u2014 from a child in wartime Germany to one of the most influential institutional architects of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. What does the Intelligent Age look like from that vantage point \u2014 not the strategic analysis, but the personal experience of having lived through enough of history to know what is genuinely at stake when the tools of power change faster than the wisdom to use them wisely?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klaus Schwab<\/strong>: <\/strong>I was a small child when the institutions meant to restrain power in my country failed completely, and I grew up in the physical wreckage of what that failure produced. I do not say this to draw a dramatic parallel between that catastrophe and artificial intelligence; they are not the same, and I am wary of anyone who reaches too quickly for the darkest historical analogy. But that early experience left me with a conviction I have never lost: that the tools available to human beings, whether industrial machinery or intelligent systems, do not by themselves determine whether they are used well or badly. What determines that is whether the institutions of restraint, accountability, and shared purpose keep pace with the tools. Germany in the years before my birth had enormous industrial and organizational capability and catastrophically weak institutions to direct it. That asymmetry, more than any single technology, is what I have spent my professional life trying to prevent from recurring.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So when I look at the Intelligent Age from this vantage point, what strikes me is not the technology itself, remarkable as it is. It is the pace. I founded the Forum at thirty-three because I believed, as a young academic, that the postwar economic order needed better mechanisms for cooperation than it had, and I assumed there would be decades to build them. The Intelligent Age does not obviously afford us decades. What I have learned across fifty years is that wisdom, the capacity to ask not only what we can build but what we should build and whom it must serve, has never moved as fast as our tools, in any era I have lived through. It does not need to move faster than the tools. It needs to move fast enough that the gap between the two never again becomes as wide as it was in the country of my birth. That is the only test that has ever mattered to me, and it is the one I am asking this book, and this series, to serve.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Qx. Anything else you wish to add?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klaus Schwab<\/strong>: <\/strong>Only this. Readers will finish the Intelligent Age<\/em> book series looking for a verdict on whether artificial intelligence will ultimately be good or bad for humanity. I do not think that is the right question, and I have resisted answering it throughout my career for every previous technological transition, because it has never had a single answer. The outcome has always depended on choices made afterward, in boardrooms, parliaments, classrooms, and communities, by people who had not yet decided how to use what they had built. The Intelligent Age will be no different. Its outcome is not predetermined by the technology. It will be determined by whether we build institutions, at the pace this moment demands, capable of directing extraordinary power toward purposes we actually choose. The ultimate test will not be whether our machines become more intelligent. It will be whether we do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Resources<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thriving and Leading in the Intelligent Age: Mastering Change with Purpose<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

………………………………………………………………………………………….<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Professor Klaus Schwab<\/strong> (1938, Ravensburg, Germany) is the Founder of the World Economic Forum. In 1971, he published Modern Enterprise Management in Mechanical Engineering<\/em>. He argues in that book that a company must serve not only shareholders but all stakeholders to achieve long-term growth and prosperity. To promote the stakeholder concept, he founded the World Economic Forum the same year.
Professor Schwab holds doctorates in Economics (University of Fribourg) and in Engineering (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) and obtained a master\u2019s degree in Public Administration (MPA) from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
In 1972, in addition to his leadership role at the Forum, he became a professor at the University of Geneva. He has received numerous international and national honors, including 20 honorary doctorates.
His books include The Fourth Industrial Revolution<\/em> (2016), a worldwide bestseller translated into 30 languages, Shaping the Future of the Fourth Industrial Revolution<\/em> (2018), The Great Reset<\/em> (2020), and Stakeholder Capitalism<\/em> (2021).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…….<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Follow us on X<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Follow us on LinkedIn<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

“The unit of responsibility must be at least as large as the unit of power.” \u2014 Klaus Schwab, Founder of the World Economic Forum Q1. In 1971, you published Modern Enterprise Management in Mechanical Engineering and argued that a company must serve not only shareholders but all stakeholders to achieve long-term growth and prosperity. That […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[990,1901,1902,1903,1592,914,1899,1077,1900,629],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5975"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5975"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5975\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5983,"href":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5975\/revisions\/5983"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5975"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5975"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.odbms.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5975"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}